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Abstrat. This paper deals with an extension of the onept of orrelated strategies to Markov
stopping games. The Nash equilibrium approah to solving nonzero-sum stopping games may
give multiple solutions. An arbitrator an suggest to eah player the deision to be applied at
eah stage based on a joint distribution over the players' deisions. This is a form of equilibrium
seletion. Examples of orrelated equilibria in nonzero-sum games related to the sta seletion
ompetition in the ase of two departments are given. Utilitarian, egalitarian, republian and
libertarian onepts of orrelated equilibria seletion are used.
1. Introdution. In this paper an alternative approah to the sta seletion ompeti-
tion in the ase of two departments onsidered by Baston and Garnaev [2℄ is proposed.
The formulation of the problem in Baston and Garnaev [2℄ is as follows. Two departments
in an organisation are eah seeking to make an appointment within the same area of ex-
pertise. The heads of the two departments together interview the appliants in turn and
make their deisions on one appliant before interviewing any others. If a andidate is
rejeted by both departmental heads, the andidate annot be onsidered for either post
at a later date. When both heads deide to make an oer, they onsider the following
possibilities.
1. The departments are equally attrative, so that an appliant has no preferene between
them;
2. One department an oer better prospets to appliants, who will always hoose that
department.
2000 Mathematis Subjet Classiation: Primary 60C40; Seondary 90A46.
Key words and phrases: orrelated equilibria, Nash equilibria, non-zero sum game, seretary
problem.
The paper is in nal form and no version of it will be published elsewhere.
The idea of this paper was presented at Game Theory and Mathematial Eonomis, Inter-
national Conferene in Memory of Jerzy o± (19201998), Warsaw, September 2004 [25, 26℄.
[1]
2 D. RAMSEY AND K. SZAJOWSKI
The departmental heads know that there are preisely N appliants and that eah ap-
pliant has a level of expertise whih is random. It is assumed that the interview proess
enables the diretors to observe these levels of expertise, whih form a sequene of i.i.d
random variables from a ontinuous distribution. If no appointment is made to a de-
partment from these N appliants, then the department will suer from a shortfall of
expertise. Game 2 has one Nash equilibrium, whih an be used as the solution to the
problem. Game 1 has many has many Nash equilibria. This raises the question of equi-
librium seletion. Baston and Garnaev [2℄ interpreted suh a variety of Nash equilibria
solutions as a way of modelling dierent dynamis within the organisation, whih an
result in various outomes during the onsription proess. If one departmental head is
aggressive and one passive, we might expet a dierent outome to the one in whih
both are of a similar temperament. When both have a similar temperament one expets
a symmetri strategy and value, but when they have dierent temperaments one should
expet an asymmetri equilibrium and value. The dierent harater of heads is modelled
by the notion of a Stakelberg leader. Also, the dierene in the level of ompliation of
equilibria might also be an argument justifying this approah to equilibrium seletion.
It is shown that these non-symmetri equilibria have the advantage that the players use
pure strategies, whereas at the symmetri equilibrium, the players are alled upon to
employ spei ations with ompliated probabilities.
The sta seletion problem presented above is losely related to the best hoie prob-
lem (BCP). There are some potential real appliations of deision theory whih strengthen
the motivation of the BCP (the one deision maker problem). One group of suh prob-
lems are models of many important business deisions, suh as hoosing a venture part-
ner, adopting tehnologial innovation, or hiring an employee using a sequential deision
framework (see Stein, Seale and Rapoport [35℄, Chun [7, 9, 8, 6℄). Others are an experi-
mental investigations of the seretary problem, whih ompare the optimal poliy from
the mathematial model with behaviour of human beings (see Seal and Rapoport [31, 32℄).
We have not found any suh investigation for BCP games. It ould be that the theoretial
results are not omplete enough to start applied and experimental researh.
In spite of the long history of BCP and its generalisations presented in review papers
by Freeman [14℄, Ferguson [12℄, Rose [27℄, Samuels [30℄, there are also ompetitive ver-
sions, on whih researhers' attention has been foused (see Sakaguhi [28, 29℄ for review
papers). Let us briey reall the main game theoreti models of BCP. Enns and Feren-
stein [10℄, Enns, Ferenstein and Sheahan [11℄ solved a non-zero sum game related to BCP.
Some important mathematial results related to the problem, posed in this paper, were
proven many years later by Bruss and Louhard [3℄. The full information version of the
game was solved by Chen, Rosenberg and Shepp [5℄. The relation between players is as
follows. The players have numbers: 1 and 2. When an item appears then Player 1 always
has the rst opportunity to deide whether to hire the appliant or not (unless she has
hired one already). One an say that Player 1 has priority. If Player 1 does not hire the
urrent appliant, then Player 2 an deide whether to hire the appliant or not (unless
she has hired one already). If neither player hires the urrent appliant, they interview
the next appliant. The interview proess ontinues until both players have hired an ap-
pliant. A hired appliant does not hesitate and aepts an oer without any delay or
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additional onditions. The games in this group of papers have the same strategi sheme
as in Game 2.
The onept of equal priority of the players in the seletion proess in a model of
a non-zero-sum game related to BCP was introdued by Fushimi [15℄. Szajowski [36℄
extended this model to permit random priority. Ramsey and Szajowski [22, 24℄ onsid-
ered a mathematial model of ompetitive seletion with random priority and random
aeptane of the oer (unertain employment) by andidates. Unertain employment
is a soure of additional problems, whih are solved as follows. At eah moment n the
andidate is presented to both players. If neither player has yet obtained an objet then:
(i) if only one of them would like to aept the state, then he tries to take it. In this
ase the random mehanism assigns the availability of the state (whih an depend on
the player and the moment of deision n);
(ii) if both of them are interested in this state, then the random devie hooses the player
who will rst soliit the state. The availability of the state is the same as in the situation
when only one player wants to take it. If the hosen player obtains the state, he stops
searhing;
(iii) if this state is not available to the player hosen by the random devie, then the
observed state at moment n is lost to both players. Both players ontinue searhing by
inspeting the next state.
When one player has obtained a andidate the other player ontinues searhing alone.
If this player wishes to aept a andidate, the probability that it is available to him is
the same as in point (i) above.
When a non-zero-sum game does not have a unique Nash equilibrium, then om-
muniation between the players would be useful in deiding whih equilibrium should
be played. Using the idea of orrelated strategies introdued by [1℄, the set of possible
strategies is extended to the set of orrelated stopping times and the ations undertaken
by the players are orrelated.
Little researh has been arried out on the role of ommuniation between players in
stopping games. [34℄ and [33℄ onsider orrelated equilibria in general dynami games. The
form of orrelation is not unique. The approah applied here is based on a generalisation
of randomised stopping times. Various additional riteria used by the players to orrelate
their ations restrit the set of possible solutions. These riteria are based on those used
in [18℄, whih resemble ideas of solutions of ooperative games presented in [37℄.
Strategies of sta seletion based on the onstrution of orrelated strategies aording
to various seletion riteria are presented in the setting adopted by Baston and Garnaev
[2℄. Correlated strategy seletion was proposed by the authors in [23℄.
The onstrution of orrelated equilibria in stopping games is based on the onept of
orrelated equilibria in two-by-two bimatrix games. The geometry of orrelated equilibria
in bimatrix games is desribed by Calvó-Armengol [4℄.
2. Correlated equilibria in stopping games. [1℄ introdued a orrelation sheme in
randomised strategies for non-zero-sum games extending the onept of Nash equilibrium.
Using this approah some proess of preplay ommuniation is needed to realise suh a
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strategy. Aumann's approah has been extended in various manners (eg see [13, 17, 19,
20, 38℄). The proess of adapting orrelated equilibria to stopping games starts from the
idea of orrelated stopping times.
Definition 1. A random sequene qˆ = {(q1n, q
2
n, q
3
n)} suh that, for eah n,
(i) qin is adapted to Fn for i = 1, 2, 3;
(ii) 0 ≤ q1n ≤ q
2
n ≤ q
3
n ≤ 1 a.s.
is alled a orrelated stopping strategy. The set of all suh sequenes will be denoted
by QˆN .
Let A1, A2, . . . , AN be a sequene of i.i.d. r.v. with uniform distribution on [0, 1] and
independent of the Markov proess (Xn,Fn,Px)
N
n=0. Denote ~qn = (q
1
n, q
2
n, q
3
n). Correlated
stopping times are pairs (λ1(qˆ), λ2(qˆ)) of Markov stopping times with respet to the σ-
elds Hn = σ{Fn, {A1, A2, ..., An}} dened by the strategy qˆ = (~qn) ∈ Qˆ
N
as follows:
(1) λ1(qˆ) = inf{0 ≤ n ≤ N : An ≤ q
2
n}
and
(2) λ2(qˆ) = inf{0 ≤ n ≤ N : An ≤ q
1
n or q
2
n < An ≤ q
3
n}.
The strategy qˆ will be alled the orrelation prole and it denes the pair of stopping
times (λ1(qˆ), λ2(qˆ)).
In intuitive terms, the vetor ~qn = (q
1
n, q
2
n, q
3
n) denes the joint distribution of the
ations taken by the players at moment n: with probability q1n both players hoose the
ation "stop", with probability q2n − q
1
n Player 1 stops and Player 2 hooses the ation
"ontinue", with probability q3n − q
2
n Player 1 ontinues and Player 2 stops and with
probability 1−q3n both players ontinue. A orrelated strategy qˆ is assumed to be dened
by preplay ommuniation between the players (either before the start of the game or
before eah deision) with the possible aid of an "external judge". If ommuniation
only takes plae before the game ommenes, then suh a orrelation is said to be a
stationary orrelation devie. If ommuniation may our at eah deision point, then
suh a orrelation is said to be an extensive (autonomous) orrelation devie (see [33℄).
In general, we onsider extensive orrelation devies. The form of the orrelated strategy
is known to both players.
If one player arries out the ations suggested by the external judge with the aid of
the appropriate lottery and the other player departs from the suggested ation a formal
onstrution of the possible strategies and the alulation of the expeted gains should
be done.
Let pˆ = (p1, p2, . . . , pN ) be a sequene in the unit interval. If Player i departs
from the orrelation prole qˆ, then the strategy of the other player is based on the
marginal orrelated prole qˆ−i and the strategy of Player i is dened by pˆi = pˆ. Denote
τ i((pˆi, qˆ−i)) = τ
i(pˆi) = inf{0 ≤ n ≤ N : A
′
n ≤ pn}, where (A
′
n)
N
n=1 is a sequene of
i.i.d. r.v. with uniform distribution on [0, 1], independent of (An)
N
n=1 and independent of
the Markov proess (Xn,Fn,Px)
N
n=0. Denote G¯i(qˆ) = Gi(λ
1(qˆ)∧λ2(qˆ), Xλ1(qˆ)∧λ2(qˆ)) and
G¯i((pˆi, qˆ−i)) = Gi(τ
i(pˆi) ∧ λ
−i(qˆ−i), Xτi(pˆi)∧λ−i(qˆ−i)). The expeted payos are dened
as Gˆi(x, qˆ) = ExG¯i(qˆ) and Gˆi(x, (pˆi, qˆ−i)) = ExG¯i((pˆi, qˆ−i)), respetively.
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Definition 2. A orrelated stopping strategy qˆ∗ ∈ QˆN is alled a orrelated equilibrium
point of Gm if
(3) Gˆi(x, qˆ
∗) ≥ Gˆi(x, (pˆi, qˆ
∗
−i))
for every x ∈ E, pˆ and i = 1, 2.
This is a denition of a orrelated equilibrium in the normal form of the game. It
should be noted that a stronger notion of orrelated equilibrium an be introdued by
requiring that the orrelation must dene an equilibrium in eah restrited game where
n steps remain (1 ≤ n ≤ N − 1).
3. Seletion of a orrelated equilibrium. Sine the set of Nash equilibria is a subset
of the set of orrelated equilibria, it is lear that whenever the problem of the seletion
of a Nash equilibria exists, the problem of the seletion of a orrelated equilibrium also
exists. However, the notion of orrelated equilibrium assumes that ommuniation takes
plae. Suh ommuniation an be used to dene the riteria used by players to selet
a orrelated equilibrium. We now formulate various riteria for seleting a orrelated
equilibria. These riteria selet subsets of CE. The onepts whih are used here do not
ome from the onepts of solution to Nash's problem of ooperative bargaining. These
onepts were used by Greenwald and Hall [18℄ for omputer learning of equilibria in
Markov games.
Definition 3. Let us formulate four dierent seletion riteria for orrelated equilibria
in a stopping game.
1. A utilitarian orrelated equilibrium is an equilibrium onstruted reursively in suh
a way that at eah stage n = N − 1, N − 2, . . . , 1 the sum of the values of the game to
the players is maximised given the equilibrium alulated for stages n + 1, n + 2, . . . , N
is played.
2. An egalitarian orrelated equilibrium is an equilibrium onstruted reursively in suh
a way that at eah stage n = N − 1, N − 2, . . . , 1 the minimum value is maximised given
the equilibrium alulated for stages n+ 1, n+ 2, . . . , N is played.
3. A republian orrelated equilibrium is an equilibrium onstruted reursively in suh
a way that at eah stage n = N − 1, N − 2, . . . , 1 the maximum value is maximised given
the equilibrium alulated for stages n+ 1, n+ 2, . . . , N is played.
4. A libertarian i orrelated equilibrium is an equilibrium onstruted reursively in suh
a way that at eah stage n = N − 1, N − 2, . . . , 1 the value of the game to Player i is
maximised given the equilibrium alulated for stages n+ 1, n+ 2, . . . , N is played.
Theorem 1. The set of orrelated equilibrium points satisfying any one of the given
riteria above is not empty.
4. One and two appliant games with no andidate preferenes. Let us assume
that the ost of not seleting an appliant is c. This is the ost of a shortfall of expertise in a
department. If a diretor selets an appliant with expertise ξi = x, the department gains
x. Let us assume that the andidates have i.i.d. expertise ξi with uniform distribution
on [0, 1]. If there is only one andidate, then the seletion proess will end with value
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Table 1. The ve verties of the orrelated equilibrium polytope
µ µss µff µfs µsf
µ∗C(α, γ) 0 0 1 0
µ∗D(α, γ) 0 0 0 1
µ∗E(α, γ)
γ
1+γ+αγ 0
1
1+γ+αγ
αγ
1+γ+αγ
µ∗F (α, γ) 0
α
1+α+αγ
1
1+α+αγ
αγ
1+α+αγ
µ∗G(α, γ)
γ
(1+α)(1+γ)
α
(1+α)(1+γ)
1
(1+α)(1+γ)
αγ
(1+α)(1+γ)
d = 12Eξ1−
1
2c =
1−2c
4 to both players (both want to selet and the probability of winning
is
1
2 for both of them). Let b = max{0,
1−2c
4 }.
4.1. Correlated equilibria of the two stage game. When there are two andidates, then
we have a two stage game. The subgame perfet Nash equilibria at the stage when the
rst andidate is interviewed will be onsidered. The payo bimatrixM2(x) is of the form
(see [2℄):
(4) M2(x) =
s f
s
f
(
(
(x+ 1
2
)
2 ,
(x+ 1
2
)
2 ) (x,
1
2 )
( 12 , x) (d, d)
)
The game has one pure Nash equlilibrium, (s, s), for x ≥ 12 and for x ≤ b has one
pure Nash equilibrium (f, f). However, for x ∈ [b, 12 ] there are two asymmetri pure
Nash equilibria and one symmetri Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies. Without extra
assumptions it is not lear whih equilibrium should be played. Baston and Garnaev [2℄
have proposed that if the players have a similar harater, then the symmetri solution
should be played. In the non-symmetri ase the idea of Stakelberg equilibrium an
be adopted. It is assumed that the rst player will be the Stakelberg leader and the
1-Stakelberg equilibrium is the solution of the problem seleted.
We will use an extensive ommuniation devie to onstrut orrelated equilibria.
In general, orrelated equilibria are not unique. Usually the set of orrelated equilibria
ontain the onvex hull of Nash equilibria. However, natural seletion riteria an be
proposed and the possibility of preplay ommuniation and use of an arbitrator solve
the problem of solution seletion. The players just speify the riterion. Suh riteria are
formulated in Setion 3. The set of solutions whih full one of the points 1-4 in denition
3 are not empty.
For M2(x), when x ∈ [b,
1
2 ] the set of orrelated equilibria is a polytope with ve
verties. Let α = 12
x− 1
2
d−x and γ = 2
d−x
x− 1
2
and let us denote µ = (µss, µff , µfs, µsf ). The
polytope of orrelated equilibria for the onsidered game has the ve verties given in
Table 1 (see Peeters and Potters [21℄). The value at eah vertex will be alulated.
(C) The values of the game to the players at vertex C are denoted by v
(C)
1 and v
(C)
2 .
v
(C)
1 =
∫ b
0
bdx+
∫ 1
2
b
1
2
dx+
1
2
∫ 1
1
2
(
x+
1
2
)
dx = b2 −
1
2
b+
9
16
,(5)
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v
(C)
2 =
∫ b
0
bdx+
∫ 1
2
b
xdx+
1
2
∫ 1
1
2
(
x+
1
2
)
dx =
1
2
b2 +
7
16
.(6)
When Player 1 takes the role of Stakelberg leader his expeted gain is v
(C)
1 , while the
Stakelberg follower has v
(C)
2 (see [2℄).
(D) The values at vertex D an be obtained from those at vertex C, beause matrix
M2(x) is symmetri.
v
(D)
1 =
1
2
b2 +
7
16
,(7)
v
(D)
2 = b
2 −
1
2
b+
9
16
.(8)
(E) The expeted gain of the players at orrelated equilibrium E given the expertise of
the andidate x ∈ [b, 12 ] is of the form.
w
(E)
1 =
(
x+
1
2
)
x− 12
2(d− 12 )
+
1
2
(
x+
1
2
)
d− x
d− 12
=
1
2
(
x+
1
2
)
,(9)
w
(E)
2 =
1
2
(
x+
1
2
)
.(10)
The value of the two-stage game to the players at vertex E is
v
(E)
1 = v
(E)
2 =
∫ b
0
bdx+
1
2
∫ 1
b
(
x+
1
2
)
dx =
3
4
b2 −
1
4
b+
1
2
.(11)
The values at these three verties are suh that v
(D)
1 < v
(E)
1 < v
(C)
1 .
(F) This orrelated equilibrium is of the form: µss = 0 and
µff =
x− 12
4d− 3x− 12
,
µsf =
2(d− x)
4d− 3x− 12
, µfs = µsf .
The expeted gain of the players at orrelated equilibrium F given the expertise of an-
didate x ∈ [b, 12 ] is
w
(F )
1 = w
(F )
2 =
d(x− 12 ) + 2(d− x)(x+
1
2 )
4(d− x) + x− 12
(12)
=
1
2
(
x+
1
2
)
+
(x− 12 )(d−
x
2 −
1
4 )
4d− 3x− 12
≤
1
2
(
x+
1
2
)
for x ∈ [b, 12 ]. The value of the two-stage game to the players at vertex F is
v
(F )
1 = v
(F )
2 = v
(E)
1 +
∫ 1
2
b
(x− 12 )(d−
x
2 −
1
4 )
4d− 3x− 12
dx < v
(E)
1 .(13)
(G) This orrelated equilibrium (the Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies) is of the
form:
µss =
4(d− x)2
(2d− x− 12 )
2
,
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µff =
(x− 12 )
2
(2d− x− 12 )
2
,
µsf =
2(d− x)(x− 12 )
(2d− x− 12 )
2
,
µfs = µsf .
The expeted gain of the players at orrelated equilibrium G given the expertise of the
andidate x ∈ [b, 12 ] is
w
(G)
1 = w
(G)
2 =
2(d− x)2(x− 12 ) + 2(d− x)(x+
1
2 )(x−
1
2 ) + d(x−
1
2 )
2
(2d− x− 12 )
2
(14)
=
1
2
(
x+
1
2
)
+
(x− 12 )
2[d− 12 (x+
1
2 )]
(2d− x− 12 )
2
≤
1
2
(
x+
1
2
)
for x ∈ [b, 12 ]. The value of the two-stage game to the players at vertex G is
v
(G)
1 = v
(G)
2 = v
(E)
1 +
∫ 1
2
b
(x− 12 )
2[d− 12 (x+
1
2 )]
(2d− x− 12 )
2
dx < v
(E)
1 .(15)
4.2. Seletion of equilibria in the two stage game. Let us apply the seletion riteria on
the set of orrelated equilibria of the two stage game. We thus dene a linear programming
problem, in whih the objetive funtion is dened by the riterion and the feasible set is
the set of vetors µ dening a orrelated equilibrium. Hene to nd a solution, we ompare
the appropriate values at eah vertex of the orrelated equilibria polytope desribed in
the previous setion.
It should be noted that when either the republian or egalitarian riterion is used,
the solution is given by the appropriate solution from one of two linear programming
problems. In these ases the two linear programming problems are:
1) Maximise v1 given the equilibrium onstraints and the onstraint v1 ≤ v2 when the
egalitarian ondition is used or v1 ≥ v2 when the republian ondition is used.
2) Maximise v2 given the equilibrium onstraints and the onstraint v2 ≤ v1 when the
egalitarian ondition is used or v2 ≥ v1 when the republian ondition is used.
From the symmetry of the game the hyperplane µfs − µsf = 0 splits the set of
orrelated equilibria into the two feasible sets for these problems and µ = (0, 0, 12 ,
1
2 )
beomes a vertex of the feasible set in eah of the problems. We all this vertex H. This
vertex replaes vertex C or vertex D depending on the additional onstraint. We have
(16) v
(H)
1 = v
(H)
2 =
v
(C)
1 + v
(D)
1
2
= v
(E)
1 .
4.2.1. Libertarian equilibria. From (5)(15) it follows that the maximal game value for
the rst player is guaranteed at vertex (f, s) and for the seond player at (s, f). It means
that δ⋆L1 = (f, s) = C is the libertarian 1 and δ
⋆
L2 = (s, f) = D is the libertarian 2
orrelated equilibrium. In relation to the solutions presented by Baston and Garnaev, the
libertarian i equilibrium orresponds to the Stakelberg solution at whih Player i takes
the role of the Stakelberg leader.
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4.2.2. Egalitarian equilibria. Let us denote vδ = mini∈{1,2} v
δ
i . We are looking for δ
⋆
E
suh that vδ
⋆
E = maxδ v
δ
. For δ ∈ {E,F,G,H} we have vδ1 = v
δ
2, v
(F )
1 < v
(E)
1 = v
(H)
1
and v
(G)
1 < v
(E)
1 . For δ ∈ {C,D} the minimal values are v
(C) = v
(C)
2 and v
(D) = v
(D)
1 .
Moreover, v
(C)
2 = v
(D)
1 < v
(E)
1 . Therefore E and H dene egalitarian equilibria and
vδ
⋆
E = v
(E)
1 . It follows that any linear ombination of these equilibria pE+(1−p)H, where
p ∈ [0, 1] denes an egalitarian equilibrium. It should be noted that H is an intuitively
pleasing solution, sine it orresponds to a solution in whih the players observe the toss
of a oin and if heads appears Player 1 ats as the Stakelberg leader, otherwise Player
2 plays this role. This is one of the solutions onsidered by Baston and Garnaev. At any
of the other solutions the arbitrator must send signals to eah of the players separately
in order to obtain the appropriate orrelation. It should be noted that the value of the
game to the players is independent of the egalitarian solution adopted.
4.2.3. Republian equilibria. Let us denote V δ = maxi∈{1,2} v
δ
i . Similar onsideration
of the verties as made in the ase of egalitarian equilibria leads to onlusion that the
republian equilibria are δ⋆R ∈ {C,D} and V
δ⋆
R = v
(C)
1 = v
(D)
2 . These are the only two
solutions, sine they are the unique solutions of the two appropriate linear programming
programmes desribed above and orrespond to the Stakelberg solutions.
4.2.4. Utilitarian equilibria. Let us denote vδ+ = v
δ
1 + v
δ
2. We have v
(C)
+ = v
(D)
+ =
3
2b
2 −
b
2 +1 = 2v
(E)
1 . Sine 2b ≤ x+
1
2 , it follows that v
(C)
+ > v
(F )
+ and v
(C)
+ > v
(G)
+ . Hene, C,D
and E are utilitarian equilibria. It follows that any linear ombination pC + qD + rE
(p, q, r ≥ 0, p+ q + r = 1) denes a utilitarian equilibrium. v
δ⋆
U
+ = v
(C)
+ = v
(D)
+ = v
(E)
+ . It
should be noted thatH is a linear omibination of these three verties with p = q = 12 , r =
0. Also, the value of the game to the players is dependent on the utilitarian equilibrium
played.
5. Seletion of equilibria in the multi-stage game. We dene orrelated equilibria
by reursion as a series of orrelated equilibria in the appropriately dened matrix games.
The orrelated strategy used when both players are deiding whether to aept or rejet
the n-th last andidate is given by µn = (µn,ss, µn,ff , µn,fs, µn,sf ). The game played on
observing the n-th last andidate is given by
Mn(x) =
s f
s
f
(
(x+un−12 ,
x+un−1
2 ) (x, un−1)
(un−1, x) (v
π
n−1, w
π
n−1)
)
,
where un is the optimal expeted reward of a lone searher with n andidates remaining
(see [2℄) and vπn , w
π
n are the values of the n-stage game to Players 1 and 2, respetively,
when the equilibrium π is played. From the form of the payo matrix it an be seen that
(s, s) is the unique Nash equilibrium when x > un−1. Similarly, (f, f) is the unique Nash
equilibrium when x < min{vπn−1, w
π
n−1}.
5.1. Libertarian equilibria. First we onsider N = 3. From the alulations made for
N = 2, it follows that vL12 > w
L1
2 . Considering the payo matrix (f, s) is the unique
Nash equilibrium for vL12 < x < w
L1
2 and both (f, s) and (s, f) are pure Nash equilibrium
for vL12 < x < u2. There is also an equilibrium in mixed strategies on this interval.
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Thus, we only need to onsider equilibrium seletion for vL12 < x < u2. Sine the payo
matrix is now longer symmetri, the verties of the polytope dening the set of orrelated
equilibrium are of a dierent form. However, sine (f, s) is a Nash equilibrium, µ3 =
(0, 0, 1, 0) is a vertex of this polytope. For vL12 < x < u2, it an be seen that u2 is
the maximal payo in the payo matrix. It follows that µ3 is the vertex that stritly
maximises the expeted payo of Player 1 and thus uniquely denes the libertarian 1
equilibrium. It follows that vL13 > w
L1
3 and hene M4(x) is of a similar form toM3(x). By
iteration it follows that Player 1 plays the role of the Stakelberg leader at the libertarian
1 solution. Analogously, Player 2 plays the role of the Stakelberg leader at the libertarian
2 solution. For the value funtions see [2℄.
5.2. Egalitarian equilibrium. It will be shown by indution that for N ≥ 3 an egalitarian
equilibrium is of the same form as for N = 2. Suppose that vEn−1 = w
E
n−1. The oordinates
of the verties of the polytope desribing the set of orrelated equilibria is of the form given
in Table 1 with α = un−1−x2(x−vn−1) and γ =
2(x−vn−1)
un−1−x
. Considering the values of the game at
these verties when x ∈ [vn−1, un−1], the egalitarian riterion is satised at verties E and
H. It follows that vEn = w
E
n and any linear ombination of E and H denes an egalitarian
equilibrium. Sine vE2 = v
E
2 it follows by indution that an egalitarian equilibrium is of
the required form. In partiular, the equilibrium obtained by deiding who plays the role
of Stakelberg leader based on the result of a oin toss denes an egalitarian equilibrium.
5.3. Republian equilibria. Suppose libertarian 1 is taken to be the republian equilib-
rium for the last 2 stages. For N = 3 the alulations are similar to the alulations made
for the libertarian 1 equilibrium. It an be shown that the libertarian 1 equilibrium again
maximises the maximum value. Using an iterative argument, it an be shown that the
libertarian 1 equilibrium is a republian equilibrium. By the symmetry of the game it
follows that the libertarian 2 equilibrium is also a republian equilibrium.
5.4. Utilitarian equilibria. Unfortunately, the value funtion of a utilitarian equilibrium
for N = 2 is not uniquely dened. In order to nd a "globally optimal" utilitarian
equilibrium, we annot use simple reursion. From the form of the payo matrix it an
be seen that when max{vn−1, wn−1} < x < un−1 the maximum sum of payos is x +
un−1. This is obtained when at least one of the players aepts the andidate. Suh
a payo is attainable at a orrelated equilibrium, sine (f, s) and (s, f) are orrelated
equilibrium. It follows from the denition of a utilitarian equilibrium that µn,ff = 0
when max{vn−1, wn−1} < x < un−1.
Theorem 2. The libertarian equilibria are the only globally optimal utilitarian equilibria
for N ≥ 3 (ignoring strategies whose ations dier from those dened by one of these
strategies on a set with probability measure zero).
Proof. First we show that among the set of utilitarian equilibria the minimum value is
minimised at the libertarian equilibria for N ≥ 2. Considering the values of the game at
the verties of the set of utilitarian orrelated equilibria when N = 2 (obtained by adding
the additional ondition that µ2,ff = 0 for b < x <
1
2 ), the minimum value is minimised
at the two libertarian equilibria. From the form of the two linear programming problems
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that dene this minimisation problem, it follows that these solutions are the only suh
solutions.
By symmetry wL1n = v
L2
n . Set k
π
n = min{v
π
n , w
π
n}. Assume that w
L1
n < k
π
n for all
π 6= L1, L2. We have
wL1n+1 =
∫ wL1
n
0
wL1n dx+
∫ un
wL1
n
xdx+
1
2
∫ 1
un
(x+ un)dx
kπn+1 ≥
∫ kπ
n
0
kπndx+
∫ un
kπ
n
gπn(x)dx+
1
2
∫ 1
un
(x+ un)dx,
where gπn(x) is the expeted reward of suh a player given that x ∈ [k
π
n , un]. From the
ondition that µn,ff = 0 it follows that g
π
n(x) ≥ x, ∀x ∈ [k
π
n , un] and
kπn+1 − w
L1
n+1 ≥ (k
π
n)
2 − (wL1n )
2 −
∫ kπ
n
wL1
n
xdx =
(kπn)
2 − (wL1n )
2
2
> 0.
Sine among utilitarian equilibria the minimum value is minimised at the libertarian
equilibria when N = 2, it follows by indution that among utilitarian equilibria the
minimum value is minimised at the libertarian equilibria for n ≥ 2. By symmetry vL1n +
wL1n = v
L2
n + w
L2
n .
We now show that the libertarian strategies are the only globally optimal utilitarian
strategies for N ≥ 3. From the analysis of the two stage game vπ2 + w
π
2 =
3b2
2 −
b
2 + 1
for any utilitarian equilibrium. Suppose vL1n +w
L1
n > v
π
n +w
π
n. From the onditions for a
utilitarian equilibrium π, it follows that
vπn+1 + w
π
n+1 =
∫ kπ
n
0
(vπn + w
π
n)dx+
∫ 1
kπ
n
(x+ un)dx
vL1n+1 + w
L1
n+1 − (v
π
n+1 + w
π
n+1)
=
∫ wL1
n
0
[vL1n + w
L1
n − (v
π
n + w
π
n)]dx+
∫ kπ
n
wL1
n
[x+ un − (v
π
n + w
π
n)]dx
>
∫ kπ
n
wL1
n
[x+ un − (v
π
n + w
π
n)]dx
=
∫ kπ
n
wL1
n
[x+ un − (v
L1
n + w
L1
n ) + v
L1
n + w
L1
n − (v
π
n + w
π
n)]dx > 0.
This inequality follows from the indution assumption vL1n + w
L1
n − (v
π
n + w
π
n) > 0,
together with vL1n < un. It an be shown that v
L1
3 +w
L1
3 − (v
π
3 +w
π
3 ) > 0 using a similar
argument for n = 2 (the rst inequality in the argument beomes an equality). It follows
by indution that for N ≥ 3 the libertarian equilibria are the only utilitarian equilibria
whih are globally optimal in the sense of the utilitarian riterion.
6. Final remarks. In his reent paper, Garnaev [16℄ has extended the game model
introdued in Baston and Garnaev [2℄ to onsider the situation where three skills of the
andidate are taken into aount. The proposed solutions to Garnaev's problem are Nash
equilibria and Stakelberg strategies, as in [2℄, and these solutions are derived in his paper.
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One an also onstrut orrelated equilibria for this model, whih will be the subjet of
further investigation.
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